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This paper investigates whether aid ﬂows to developing countries ﬁt well with their devel-
opment priorities. In particular, we examine aid allocation across sectors in a given recipient
country by using sectoral data on aid and indicators that measure the recipient’s need for
aid in each sector. The data show that inter-recipient aid allocation reﬂects the recipient’s
need. However, we found no evidence that inter-sectoral allocation ﬁts with national prior-
ities except in high- and middle-income East Asian countries. Our evidence shows that the
quality of bureaucracy and corruption in recipient countries impede eﬃcient inter-sectoral
allocation.
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The core purpose of giving aid is to contribute to improving economic welfare and stimulate
growth in recipient countries. However, many recent studies such as Easterly et al. (2004) and
Roodman (2004) ﬁnd little evidence of the positive impact of aid.1 While it remains an open
question whether aid can promote growth, one of the tentative answers to this question is that
aid can be eﬀective only if donors select aid projects appropriately. In this sense, aid allocation
matters. In this paper, we suppose that good donors should care about aid allocation.
The allocation of aid has been studied extensively. For example, Alesina and Dollar (2000),
Dollar and Levin (2004) and Sawada et al. (2007) focus on the determinants of aid allocation
across countries and examine whether donors are selective on poverty and whether they give
aid to countries with a good policy environment.2 These papers provide empirical evidence that
some donors are selective on poverty while the results for the large donors such as Japan and the
United States are mixed. Note that these studies use aggregate data on aid and do not take into
account diﬀerences in aid projects. It is likely that using aggregate data is partially responsible
for the mixed results because there are many kinds of aid projects. Each project has its own
purpose; aid in some sectors such as food, health and education does not necessarily contribute
to income growth in a short period (Clemens et al., 2004).
In this paper, we take into account diﬀerences in the purposes of aid by using sectoral data
on aid so that we can consider two types of aid allocation in a manner to be described. Suppose
that there are two types of aid: food aid and infrastructure investment; if the total budget for
food aid is given, the ideal donor gives more aid to countries that need more food; and if the
donor’s budget for road construction is limited, the donor should give more aid to countries that
need more road projects. This is the issue of aid allocation across recipient countries in a given
sector (Thiele et al., 2006, 2007; Kasuga, 2007). The other issue is aid allocation across sectors
1While Burnside and Dollar (2000) suggest that the impact of aid on growth is positive only if recipients have
good policies, most of the recent studies ﬁnd that their results are not robust.
2While these papers employ regression analysis to explore the determinants of aid allocation, Baulch (2006)
use a diﬀerent approach to evaluate donor performance. His paper constructs aid concentration curves, which
graphically demonstrate the extent to which diﬀerent donors are distributing aid to the poorest countries. To
examine whether donors contribute to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, he constructs aid concen-
tration curves not only for monetary poverty but also for child malnutrition, primary school enrollments and
under-ﬁve mortality while using only aggregate data on aid.
2in a given recipient country. For example, if a recipient has enough food but suﬀers from a lack
of infrastructure, donors should spend more money on infrastructure to improve the welfare of
the recipient. Although aid allocation across sectors may play an important role in improving
aid eﬀectiveness, it has to our knowledge not been explored.
It is debatable whether donors should provide economic infrastructure to stimulate growth
or place a high priority on poverty-oriented projects.3 At the moment, there is no clear answer
to this question. However, we can predict that the optimal inter-sectoral allocation varies across
recipient countries. Canning and Bennathan (2000) provide empirical evidence that infrastruc-
ture (electricity generating capacity and paved roads) has diminishing returns and is highly
complementary with physical and human capital.4 This suggests that, to make aid more eﬀec-
tive, donors should increase infrastructure investment in needed sectors. Similarly, allocation
between infrastructure investment and poverty-oriented projects also matters because protect-
ing public health and the people vulnerable to unforeseen shocks improves the productivity of
capital.5 Hence, aid will be most eﬀective if it ﬁts well with the recipient’s priorities.
In reality, there are too many aid projects and too many donors (both countries and agen-
cies) for each recipient. Without coordination among donors, aid can be misallocated and then
not eﬀective in a recipient country. It is widely believed that the proliferation of donors and aid
channels has adverse eﬀects on aid quality (Morss, 1984; Cassen and Associates, 1994; Acharya
et al., 2006; Roodman, 2006). While donors have been talking about the problem of proliferation
for a long time, progress to date is very limited.6 While there are too many projects and donors,
there is no apparatus that can allocate aid resources in a recipient country; hence, the lack
of coordination surely causes misallocation across sectors. Nevertheless, we do not know how
much aid is misallocated in a recipient country. This paper investigates whether aid allocation
is eﬃcient. In particular, we investigate whether donors strike a balance between infrastruc-
ture investment and poverty-oriented projects, taking into account the recipient’s development
3For recent theoretical work on the impact of aid on growth, see Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2007) and Kalaitzi-
dakis and Kalyvitis (2008).
4For theoretical work, see Barro (1990) and Futagami et al. (1993).
5Strauss and Thomas (1998) provide a comprehensive review of evidence for the link between health and
productivity.
6Acharya et al. (2006) show how donors have been trying to tackle the problem. Conventional approaches are
coordination, sector-wide approaches, budget support, and sector specialization.
3priorities.
2 Assessment procedure and data
In this paper, we evaluate aid allocation by examining whether donors provide much-needed aid
projects. When we use aggregate data on aid ﬂows as in many earlier studies, one natural way
to evaluate donors is to examine whether their aid is directed to poor countries. However, once
we use sectoral data on aid, we can consider other types of aid allocation. One is aid allocation
across recipients within a sector and the other is aid allocation across sectors in a recipient
country. While the empirical evidence on the former is reviewed in Section 3, the main purpose
of the paper is to evaluate aid allocation across sectors.
To examine inter-sectoral allocation, we have to make an assumption about donors’ decision
making. As discussed in Section 1, since there are too many aid projects for a recipient, the lack
of coordination among donors causes misallocation. We suspect that donors pay little attention
to the recipient’s priorities when they determine the inter-sectoral aid allocation; although we
need to specify the aid allocation model to estimate the true parameter value of the model,
unfortunately, there is no a priori information regarding the inter-sectoral allocation model.7
Even if we have information on a donor’s decision rule for allocating aid, it may vary across
donors. Hence, it is diﬃcult to estimate the true value of the model parameter. In Section 5,
we use regression analysis but it does not intend to estimate the true parameter value.
In this paper, without specifying the aid allocation rule, we examine whether aid for a sector
is associated with recipients’ need for the sector. In Sections 3 and 4, we compute Spearman’s
rank correlation coeﬃcient, which does not require the assumption that the relationship between
the variables is linear. In Sections 5 and 6, we use the Tobit model; we test the null hypothesis
that aid ﬂows are not associated with the need. We do not specify the allocation model but
instead consider as many speciﬁcations as possible. To be more precise, we test the hypothesis
that the ratio of infrastructure investment to poverty-oriented projects varies negatively with
7For inter-recipient allocation, some donors have their own aid allocation formula. See, for example, IDA’s
performance-based allocation system (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Seminar%20PDFs
/73449-1172525976405/3492866-1172527584498/PBAformula.pdf).
4nonnecessity in infrastructure investment and positively with nonnecessity in poverty-oriented
projects. Since there are several types of infrastructure investments (transport, communications,
energy, education) and poverty-oriented projects (food, health, humanitarian aid), we need to
test the hypothesis for every pair. Although there is no information on donors’ allocation models,
if we reject the null hypothesis for all of the speciﬁcations, it is reasonable to conclude that the
donor’s aid allocation reﬂects the recipient’s need.
We use data on bilateral aid from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which
reports aid commitments for about 200 distinct purposes for all donors and recipients annually
since 1973 (Data Appendix A lists 22 member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee).8 We aggregate project-level data to the sector level, and examine the following
sectors: 1) Food; 2) Health; 3) Humanitarian aid; 4) Transport and storage; 5) Communications;
6) Energy generation and supply; 7) Education; and 8) Action relating to debt. Data Appendix
B lists the CRS codes for the eight sectors. Table 1 lists the ﬁve largest donors in each sector.
We focus on these sectors because they receive a high proportion of total aid ﬂows, and because
indicators that measure the recipient’s need are available for each of the sectors. Table 2 shows
the share of each donor’s total aid per sector. Note that while each of the sectors in Table 2 has
a relatively large share, most of them are much smaller than 10 percent (because there are about
200 CRS purpose codes). Tables 1 and 2 demonstrate that donors have their own preference
over aid purposes; the share of economic infrastructure investment (sectors 4-6) is very large for
Japanese aid but relatively small for U.S. aid. These tables show Japanese strength in economic
infrastructure investment and the U.S strength in poverty-oriented projects (sectors 1-3). While
earlier studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000) show that aid allocation across countries varies
across donors, aid allocation across sectors also varies.
To measure the recipient’s need for each sector, we use indicators from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI). For example, the recipient’s need for sectors 1 (food) and
2 (health) are measured by prevalence of undernourishment and birth attended by skilled health
staﬀ, respectively. Note that these two sectors are closely related to the Millennium Development
8We use commitments rather than disbursements and use the total amount of aid rather than grant equivalent
because our purpose is to investigate whether the selection of projects reﬂects the recipient’s need rather than
how much money a donor generously grants.
5Goals (MDGs) and the indicators are actually used in the MDGs to monitor progress. Data
Appendix B lists indicators for each of the eight sectors.
In the following sections, using sectoral data on aid, we examine the association between aid
ﬂows and the recipient’s development need. Section 3 examines aid allocation across countries
and reviews the literature that uses sectoral data on aid. Section 4 focuses on allocation across
sectors in a recipient country. In Section 5, we test whether the ratio of infrastructure investment
to poverty-oriented projects is associated with the recipient’s development priorities. In Section
6, we investigate whether inter-sectoral allocative eﬃciency diﬀers across recipient countries.
Section 7 concludes.
3 Allocation across countries
Before turning to inter-sectoral allocation, we review inter-recipient allocation as in most of
the literature on aid allocation (that uses aggregate data). We investigate whether aid ﬂows
are associated with the recipient’s need using sectoral data on aid by each donor. If we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant association, then it suggests that the inter-recipient allocation of aid is consistent with
the need. As shown in Data Appendix B, we use indicators from WDI to measure the recipient’s
need. Using the 20 quantiles of each indicator, we create a categorical variable for each sector’s
need from 1 (the minimum among the recipients) to 20 (the maximum among the recipients).
We calculate Spearman’s rank correlation coeﬃcient (ρ), which is nonparametric and does not
require the assumption that the relationship between the variables is linear, to measure the
association between the recipient’s need and the recipient’s share of total aid from each donor.
The share is denoted by aidp,r/aidp, where p is a subscript for each purpose of aid and r is a
subscript for each recipient. We use Spearman’s ρ instead of the common parametric correlation
coeﬃcient because we assume that good donors should give more aid to the recipient with a
worse environment, but the amount of aid does not have to increase linearly with the measure for
the recipient’s need (we simply assume that a recipient with the ith-worst environment should
receive the ith-largest aid).
Table 3 shows the number of cases where Spearman’s ρ is signiﬁcantly positive (at the 10
6percent level) for 22 donors and for seven ﬁve-year periods. The number is relatively small in
the 1970s and 1980s because of the limited availability of the indicators of need. After 1990,
major donors are selective in many sectors. For example, in the period 1991-1995, Switzerland
(CHE), Germany (DEU), Italy (ITA) and the United States (USA) have a signiﬁcantly positive
coeﬃcient in seven or eight sectors. In most of the sectors, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association, which
implies that donors allocate more aid to countries with a worse environment. The results also
show that the inter-recipient allocation is consistent with the need not only for poverty-oriented
projects (sectors 1-3) but also for infrastructure investment (sectors 4-6). For example, in the
period 2001-2005, Germany, France (FRA) and the United Kingdom (GBR) have a signiﬁcant
ρ in six sectors except education and action relating to debt; Japan (JPN) in ﬁve sectors except
education, action relating to debt and humanitarian aid; the United States in ﬁve sectors except
education, action relating to debt, and communications; Sweden (SWE) and Denmark (DNK)
in ﬁve sectors except education, food and action relating to debt. While aid for education is
not associated with the need in all the periods for most donors, action relating to debt by some
donors is associated with the need.
Earlier studies that use sectoral data also show that aid for education is not closely associated
with the need. For example, using control variables such as income, population and democracy
indices, and some alternative indicators of education (such as persistence to Grade 5 and lit-
eracy rate), Kasuga (2007) shows that aid for education by most donors, except France, is not
associated with the recipient’s need. For other sectors such as food, health and STD control,
the previous studies demonstrate that, to some extent, inter-recipient aid allocation reﬂects the
recipient’s need as in Table 3. Kasuga (2007) shows that the majority of donors give aid to
poorer countries; Thiele et al. (2006) shows that the indicators of the need aﬀect the donor’s
decision to provide or not to provide aid to a particular country.
4 Allocation across sectors: rank correlation coeﬃcient
We now proceed to the investigation of allocation across sectors. We use the same data as above
but need a variable that represents recipient priorities. By using the indicator of need for each
7sector in Section 3, which ranges from 1 to 20, we construct a new variable that represents the
recipient’s relative need across sectors. We prioritize the sectors using the above rank order
(among the recipients) as follows: for example, if a country has 2 for food, 13 for transport and
storage, and 10 for education, then the ﬁrst priority among the three sectors is transport and
storage, the second is education and the third is food.
We also need to measure a donor’s relative eﬀort across sectors of the recipient. Note that
the sector’s share in a recipient aidp,r/aidr, where p is a subscript for each sector (purpose of aid)
and r is a subscript for each recipient, does not accurately capture a donor’s eﬀort to allocate
aid according to the recipient’s priorities. Some sectors need more money than other sectors;
generally speaking, an infrastructure project is more costly than a program for food. Hence,
aidp,r/aidr does not reﬂect the donor’s relative eﬀort in sector p. For example, by comparing
the share of food aid with that of investment in infrastructure, we cannot measure the donor’s
relative eﬀort to save people from starvation because the actual share for food aid is small on
average (see Table 2). To address this issue, we construct a new variable that represents the
donor’s relative eﬀort across sectors as follows. First, using the 10 quantiles of each donor’s
sector share in recipient r (aidp,r/aidr), we create a categorical variable for each donor’s eﬀort,
which ranges from 1 (the least among the donors) to 10 (the greatest among the donors). Using
this variable measuring the donor’s eﬀort in each sector, we determine the donor’s relative eﬀort
across sectors. For example, if a donor has 9 for food, 5 for transport and storage and 8 for
education, then we suppose that this donor makes the greatest eﬀort for food among the three
sectors, the 2nd greatest eﬀort for education and the least eﬀort for transport and storage.
As in Section 3, we now calculate rank correlation coeﬃcients between the donor’s relative
eﬀort across sectors and the recipient’s relative need across sectors. Table 4 shows the number
of cases where Spearman’s ρ is signiﬁcantly positive (at the 10 percent level) for 22 donors and
for seven ﬁve-year periods. For each donor, there are at most 125 recipients in each period.
However, there are at most 12 cases where Spearman’s ρ is signiﬁcant.9 This result implies that
donors’ relative eﬀort across sectors does not ﬁt well with the national development priorities
of most recipients. For example, in the period 2001-2005, the United States gave aid to 124
9Note that, as in Table 3, the availability of the indicators of need is limited in the 1970s and 1980s.
8countries, but we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ρ only in 12 of those countries. Germany gave aid to 121
countries, but we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive ρ only in three countries. Other major donors such
as Japan, France and the United Kingdom also gave aid to over 100 countries, but there are at
most nine cases where the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant.
Note that the results above do not necessarily imply the inter-sectoral allocation is ineﬃcient.
The assessment procedure is based on the ranking of donors in terms of eﬀort (aidp,r/aidr) and
does not use information on the eﬃcient inter-sectoral allocation (which is not available). For
example, suppose that the optimal ratio of food to transport is 1:2 for a recipient; Donor
A chooses this optimal allocation 1:2 and Donor B chooses 1:3. In this example, Donor A’s
allocation is optimal and Donor B overinvests in transport. However, our assessment procedure
may appreciate Donor B in the case where the recipient’s ﬁrst priority is transport because we
appreciate intensive eﬀorts to the sector that needs the most urgent assistance. Thus, even
if the inter-sectoral allocation is optimal in many recipients, we may not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
correlation coeﬃcient. Moreover, donors may not have to achieve a recipient’s optimal allocation
independently; in reality, because there are so many donors for each recipient, what matters most
for a recipient is the inter-sectoral allocation of aid by all donors.
5 Allocation across sectors: regression results
As discussed above, there are diﬃculties in assessing inter-sectoral allocation by each donor. In
this section, we focus on aid ﬂows from all the donors to each recipient to examine whether aid
allocation ﬁts well with the recipient’s development priorities. Using cross-country data on aid
ﬂows to recipient r in period t (1996-2000, 2001-2005), we estimate
aidi,r
aidj,r
= β0 + β1index(i)r + β2index(j)r + β3
aidi,r
aidj,r
(t − 1) + er (1)
where index(i)r and index(j)r are measures of recipient r’s need (nonnecessity) for sectors
i and j, respectively, and er is an error term. The dependent variable is the ratio of aid i
(infrastructure investment: sector 4, 5, 6 or 7) to aid j (poverty-oriented projects: sector 1, 2 or
93).10 We test whether the dependent variable reﬂects the need in each sector of the recipient.
For example, if the numerator of the dependent variable (aidi,r) is aid for education, then we
examine whether school enrollment ratio, which is an indicator for the measure of need for
education, has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the dependent variable. The measure of need for recipient
r is calculated as the deviation from the worst environment: index(p)r = (|indicator(p) −
indicator(p)r|)/indicator(p), where p represents sector p and the underlined term represents
the worst environment measured by the indicator for p.11 Hence, index(p)r actually reﬂects
nonnecessity (0 represents the worst environment and large values correspond to good conditions)
in sector p; then β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 imply that allocation between infrastructure investment and
poverty-oriented projects reﬂects the relative needs. The indicators for each sector are listed in
Data Appendix B. To avoid the problem of endogeneity, we use lagged values of each indicator.
To control for unobserved factors, we include the lagged dependent variable aidi,r/aidj,r(t − 1).
We employ the Tobit model to estimate equation (1) because there are many observations
where the numerator of the dependent variable aidi,r is zero (recipient r does not receive aid
for sector i). We cannot use observations if the denominator of the dependent variable aidj,r
is zero. Note that, while both the numerator and the denominator can be zero, aid for sectors
1-3 is less likely to be zero in our sample. We use observations after the mid-1990s because of
the data available on index(p)r. Unlike the analysis in Section 4, we can examine only a pair
of sectors at a time. However, this approach does not use information on the ranking of donors
in terms of eﬀort, and hence does not make the incorrect assessment discussed in Section 4.
In this sense, this assessment procedure complements the analysis in Section 4. Using data on
aid from all the donors to each recipient, we test the hypothesis that aid allocation between
infrastructure investment (i = 4,5,6,7) and poverty-oriented projects (j = 1,2,3) reﬂects the
recipient’s relative need.
One possible drawback of this procedure is that estimation results depend on the aid pair
i and j and may not be robust to alternative speciﬁcations. To avoid this problem, we test
10See Data Appendix B for sectors.
11Note that if p is education, we use school enrollment ratio as an indicator and then small values of indicator(p)r
correspond to bad environments; on the other hand, if p is food, prevalence of undernourishment is an indicator
and then small values of indicator(p)r correspond to good environments.
10the hypothesis for every aid pair i and j. If we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of index(i)r
on aidi,r/aidj,r (β1 < 0), we reestimate equation (1) using alternative denominators and their
indices (if we obtain β1 < 0 for j = 1, then we reestimate (1) for j = 2,3). We conclude that
index(i)r has a signiﬁcant eﬀect only when the result is robust to alternative speciﬁcations. We
do the same for index(j)r using alternative numerators and their indices (if we obtain β2 > 0
for i = 4, then we reestimate (1) for i = 5,6,7). In this manner we can cover the shortcoming
of this approach. We also use alternative indicators in Data Appendix B.
In this section, we focus on seven aid categories while there are about 200 CRS purpose codes.
We aggregate infrastructure investments into four categories and poverty-oriented projects into
three categories. Each of the categories represents a major sector, and its share is relatively large
among other sectors (however, as shown in Table 2, these seven categories amount to only about
30 percent of total aid ﬂows on average). We use this level of aggregation (codes 12110-12281
for health, codes 21010-21081 for transport and storage, codes 22010-22040 for communications,
etc.) because each category has an appropriate indicator of the need. For example, since road
complements rail services, it is possible to use one indicator to measure the need of aid for these
two sectors; however, we cannot measure the need for road and energy generation using a single
indicator because road does not complement energy generation. Similarly, we cannot measure
the need for food and health using a single indicator; hence, we should not aggregate these two
into one sector.
Table 5 shows estimation results for the case where the numerator of the dependent variable
is aid for transport and storage (i = 4). In Tables 5-8, the denominator is aid for food (j = 1) in
Columns 1 and 2, aid for health (j = 2) in Columns 3 and 4 and humanitarian aid (HA, j = 3) in
Columns 5 and 6. Thus, we examine every pair of infrastructure investment and poverty-oriented
projects. In Table 5, none of the results show that index(i)r has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on
the dependent variable. Using the alternative indicator in Data Appendix B does not alter the
results (not reported). Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the need for transport and storage aﬀects
aid in this sector. Moreover, we ﬁnd no evidence that index(j)r has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect
except in Column 6 (j = 3), yet the positive eﬀect of index(j)r in Column 6 is not robust to
11alternative numerators, as will be seen in Tables 6-8. We obtain similar results using alternative
indices. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide no evidence that inter-sectoral allocation reﬂects
the need.
Table 6 shows the estimation results for the case where the numerator of the dependent
variable is aid for communications (i = 5). None of the results show that index(i)r has a
signiﬁcantly negative eﬀects on the dependent variable. Using the alternative indicator in Data
Appendix B does not alter the results (not reported). Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the need
for communications aﬀects aid in this sector. The indices for food, health and humanitarian aid
have no signiﬁcant eﬀects. Again, the results in Table 6 provide no evidence that aid allocation
across sectors reﬂects the need.
Table 7 shows the estimation results for the case where the numerator of the dependent
variable is aid for energy generation and supply (i = 6). Again, the results do not show that
the index for energy generation and supply has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the dependent
variable; none of the results show that index(j)r have a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect. Using the
alternative indices does not alter the results (not reported). Thus, the results in Table 7 provide
no evidence that aid allocation across sectors reﬂects the need.
Table 8 shows the estimation results for the case where the numerator of the dependent
variable is aid for education (i = 7). The results do not show that the index for education has
a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on the dependent variable. Using the alternative index does not
alter the results (not reported). Thus, we ﬁnd no evidence that the need for education aﬀects
aid in this sector. The indices for food, health and humanitarian aid have no signiﬁcant eﬀects
in most cases. While in Column 4 the index for health has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect, the
result is not robust to alternative numerators in Tables 5-7 and to the alternative indicator in
Data Appendix B. Only when we use refugee population as an alternative indicator, the index
for humanitarian aid has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect in both periods (not reported). Overall,
however, the results in Table 8 provide no clear evidence that aid allocation across sectors reﬂects
the need.
As shown in Tables 5-8, we have examined every pair of infrastructure investment and
12poverty-oriented project. However, the results provide no evidence for the eﬃcient allocation
across sectors. The fact that aid ﬂows to recipient countries do not reﬂect the relative need
of the sector is consistent with the results of Table 4. As discussed earlier, the analysis of
Section 4 cannot eliminate the possibility that aid ﬂows by all donors reﬂect the need (as a
result of eﬀective coordination among donors) even if each donor’s inter-sectoral allocation does
not reﬂect the need. However, the results in this section suggest that aid ﬂows from all donors to
each recipient are not eﬃcient in the sense that allocation between infrastructure investment and
poverty-oriented projects does not ﬁt well with the recipient’s national development priorities.
Of course, some donors may still care about aid allocation across sectors, even if the donors
cannot coordinate their activities. To examine this possibility, we estimate equation (1) using
data for each donor. The results for the ﬁve largest donors in each sector (i = 4,5,6,7) do
not qualitatively alter our conclusions on inter-sectoral allocation. There are only two cases
where we obtain β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 (at the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance): Germany (i = 6,
j = 1) and Japan (i = 7, j = 3) in the period 1996-2000. There are also some cases where we
obtain only β1 < 0: in the period 1996-2000, Germany (i = 4, j = 3), Japan (i = 6, j = 1),
France (i = 6, j = 3) and the United States (i = 7, j = 2); in the period 2001-2005, Germany
(i = 4, j = 3; i = 7, j = 1). There are several cases where we obtain only β2 > 0: in the
period 1996-2000, Japan (i = 7, j = 1) and the United Kingdom (i = 7, j = 2); in the period
2001-2005, Germany (i = 4, j = 1; i = 7, j = 1), Spain (i = 4, j = 3), Japan (i = 6, j = 1),
France (i = 7, j = 2) and the United States (i = 7, j = 3). Although these results seem to
suggest that some donors care about inter-sectoral allocation in some of the sectors, each of the
results is not robust to alternative numerators and denominators except β2 > 0 for Germany
(j = 1) in the period 2001-2005. Overall, the results demonstrate that no major donors care
about inter-sectoral aid allocation. The fact that inter-sectoral allocation does not ﬁt well with
the recipient’s development priorities can explain (at least partially) why it is so diﬃcult to ﬁnd
the positive eﬀect of aid on growth.
136 Does allocative eﬃciency diﬀer across recipients?
Our empirical evidence in Section 5 suggests that donors do not care about the recipient’s
priorities as a whole. However, it does not necessarily imply that inter-sectoral allocation is
ineﬃcient for all of the recipient countries. Allocation can be eﬃcient for some recipients because,
in reality, recipient countries can aﬀect aid allocation. Recently, multilateral and bilateral donors
have considered that national ownership and leadership of development plans are crucial for aid
to be eﬀective.12 If some countries have a good development strategy and institution, donors can
support their policies by providing aid to those countries that can be eﬀective. In this section,
we investigate whether allocative eﬃciency diﬀers across recipient countries, and if so, illustrate
the relationship between allocative eﬃciency and country characteristics.
Answering these questions will help us understand what determines aid eﬀectiveness. First,
as discussed in Section 1, better allocation between infrastructure investment and poverty-
oriented projects can promote growth because there are diminishing returns to infrastructure
investment and complementarity between infrastructure and human capital. Hence, by inves-
tigating inter-sectoral allocation, we can ﬁnd countries where aid is eﬀective in accelerating
growth. Second, the donor community recently began placing greater emphasis on country own-
ership of development programs and prioritization (International Monetary Fund, Independent
Evaluation Oﬃce, 2004). This implies that recipients are supposed to make lists of what to do
and prioritize projects to meet their own goals; donors are supposed to support country-owned
strategies for growth and poverty reduction. In this new approach, allocation depends more on
recipient countries. Since allocation can aﬀect aid eﬀectiveness, to improve the quality of aid it
is important to know what characteristics of recipient countries aﬀect allocative eﬃciency.
We examine whether inter-sectoral allocative eﬃciency diﬀers across regions. Speciﬁcally,
we add two interaction terms between indices and a dummy variable for geographic regions,
region ∗ index(i) and region ∗ index(j), to the regressions. Again, we conclude that a variable
has a signiﬁcant eﬀect only when the results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations. Here we
12Ownership is one of the key principles in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) approach introduced
by the IMF and the World Bank. See International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Oﬃce (2004) for
details.
14ﬁrst estimate the eﬀect of interaction terms for the case of j = 2. If the eﬀect is signiﬁcant, then
we examine whether the eﬀect is signiﬁcant for j = 1,3. We consider three regions that receive
the bulk of aid ﬂows: East Asia and the Paciﬁc, Sub-Sahara Africa, and Latin America.13 We
found the following results: for East Asia and the Paciﬁc, the interaction term with index(i)
has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect and the interaction term with index(j) has a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect when i = 6 and j = 2; on the other hand, for Sub-Sahara Africa, the interaction term
with index(j) has a negative eﬀect for all i (when j = 2) while the estimates are not necessarily
signiﬁcant. Although these results are not robust to alternative speciﬁcations, they may imply
that allocative eﬃciency depends on per capita income because East Asia and the Paciﬁc includes
more middle- and high-income countries than Sub-Sahara Africa. In fact, when we add the
interaction term between indices and a dummy for middle- and high-income East Asian countries
(EA), it has a signiﬁcant eﬀect and the results are robust to alternative speciﬁcations.14 Table
9 shows that EA∗index(i) is negative and signiﬁcant in Columns 1 (i = 4, j = 2) and 2 (i = 4,
j = 3), and that EA ∗ index(j) is positive and signiﬁcant in Columns 1 (i = 4, j = 2) and
3 (i = 6, j = 2). We obtain qualitatively similar results in Column 4 (i = 6, j = 2) in the
period 2001-2005, but the result is not robust to alternative speciﬁcations. To investigate the
eﬀect of per capita income, we add the interaction term between per capita income and indices.
Using the 10 quantiles of GDP per capita, we create a categorical variable from 1 to 10 for
each recipient’s income (income). The eﬀect of income ∗ index(i) is negative and signiﬁcant,
and that of income ∗ index(j) is positive and signiﬁcant in Columns 5 (i = 6, j = 2) and 6
(i = 7, j = 2). While the eﬀect of income ∗ index(i) is not robust to alternative speciﬁcations,
income ∗ index(j) has a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect both for i = 6 and i = 7. This result
suggests that high-income countries have a better inter-sectoral allocation.
If allocative eﬃciency diﬀers across recipient countries, it is reasonable to argue that various
factors, which aﬀect income, determine inter-sectoral allocative eﬃciency. In this paper, we focus
on governance because, as demonstrated by Kaufmann et al. (1999), governance aﬀects income
13We follow the World Bank classiﬁcation. East Asia and the Paciﬁc includes 29 countries. Sub-Sahara Africa
includes 47 countries and Latin America includes 37 countries.
14These middle and high income East Asian countries are China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, South Korea and Thailand while Hong Kong and Singapore received no aid in the period 1996-2005.
15and other development outcomes. Moreover, it is clear that the quality of the bureaucracy
of recipients aﬀects the management of aid projects. Hence, we examine whether governance
determines allocative eﬃciency. Speciﬁcally, we use two governance indices from Kaufmann
et al. (2007), corruption and government eﬀectiveness (which measures the quality of public
service and bureaucracy), because they are closely related to aid management. Using the 10
quantiles of each governance index, we create a dummy equal to 1 if the recipient ranks in
the bottom 10 percent of all countries, including developed countries, and 0 otherwise. We
add two interaction terms between indices and a dummy for poor governance (corruption and
government) to regressions again. In Table 10, we report the results for the case j = 2. The
results show that corruption∗index(i) has signiﬁcant positive eﬀects and corruption∗index(j)
has signiﬁcant negative eﬀects; there are ﬁve cases where the interaction term with the dummy
for corruption has a signiﬁcant eﬀect. Note that for j = 2, there are eight regression equations
in total (t =1996-2000, 2001-2005; i = 4,5,6,7). Similarly, in Table 11, government ∗ index(i)
has signiﬁcant positive eﬀects and government ∗ index(j) has signiﬁcant negative eﬀects; there
are four cases where the interaction term with the dummy for government eﬀectiveness has a
signiﬁcant eﬀect. Thus, the eﬀect of poor governance is robust to alternative speciﬁcations.
These results imply that countries with poor governance have a worse inter-sectoral allocation
because a positive eﬀect of index(i) and the negative eﬀect of index(j) imply that allocation
does not reﬂect the relative need. More speciﬁcally, in countries with poor governance, donors
tend to give less aid to much-needed sectors; the results imply that even if there is an urgent
need for aid in the health sector, donors tend to invest in economic infrastructure rather than
increase aid for health because of corruption or ineﬃcient bureaucracy in these countries. Note
that in Tables 5-8, the eﬀects of indices are not signiﬁcant in most cases and we ﬁnd no robust
eﬀects of the indices on inter-sectoral allocation; however, the interaction terms have signiﬁcant
eﬀects.15 Our evidence suggests that low-quality public service and corruption impede eﬃcient
inter-sectoral allocation in recipient countries.
15In some cases (e.g., i = 4, j = 2), after including the interaction terms, the coeﬃcient of index(i) becomes
negative and the coeﬃcient of index(j) becomes positive; however, they are not signiﬁcant. Overall, the results
do not show that β1 < 0 and β2 > 0 even after controlling for governance.
167 Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate whether aid ﬂows to developing countries ﬁt
well with their development priorities. We focus on aid allocation across sectors. In Section 4,
we examine whether the donor’s relative eﬀort across sectors is associated with the recipient’s
relative need across sectors by estimating rank correlation coeﬃcients. We ﬁnd little evidence
that donors concentrate their aid on high-priority sectors in each recipient country. However,
this assessment procedure appreciates intensive eﬀorts to priority sectors without considering the
optimal allocation, and there is a possibility that inter-sectoral allocation by all donors can be
eﬃcient even if each donor’s allocation is not eﬃcient. Hence, as a complement to the analysis in
Section 4, we test the hypothesis that the ratio of infrastructure investment to poverty-oriented
projects reﬂects the recipient’s need for the sectors using data on aid ﬂows by all donors. Again
we ﬁnd little evidence that the inter-sectoral allocation of aid ﬂows (not only by all donors
in aggregate, but also by each donor individually) reﬂects the recipient’s need. On the other
hand, we ﬁnd some evidence that countries with poor governance have extremely ineﬃcient
inter-sectoral allocation.
In summary, using sectoral data, we have found the following: 1) inter-sectoral aid allocation
does not reﬂect the recipient’s need although inter-recipient allocation is much more eﬃcient
as shown in Section 3; 2) inter-sectoral allocative eﬃciency depends on the capacity of the
public sector in recipient countries. It is reasonable to suppose that inter-sectoral allocation
for a recipient depends more on the quality of the recipient’s government, while inter-recipient
allocation is solely determined by donors. If this is true, the quality of government in a recipient
country plays a crucial role in improving inter-sectoral allocative eﬃciency, which can aﬀect aid
eﬀectiveness.
Nevertheless, even after controlling for governance, we ﬁnd little evidence that inter-sectoral
allocation is associated with the recipient’s relative need across sectors. This implies that co-
ordination among donors fails. Successful coordination improves the quality of aid even if each
donor specializes in speciﬁc sectors leaving other sectors to other donors. The contrasting results
of inter-sectoral allocation and inter-recipient allocation suggest that aid coordination among
17donors should focus more on alignment with the recipient’s development priorities.
18Data Appendix
A. List of donors
AUS Australia AUT Austria BEL Belgium CAN Canada
CHE Switzerland DEU Germany DNK Denmark ESP Spain
FIN Finland FRA France GBR United Kingdom GRC Greece
IRL Ireland ITA Italy JPN Japan LUX Luxembourg
NLD Netherlands NOR Norway NZL New Zealand PRT Portugal
SWE Sweden USA United States
Note: The member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are
listed.
B. The CRS purpose codes and the indicators
1. Food aid (code 52010)
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)∗
2. Health (code 12110-12281)
Births attended by skilled health staﬀ (% of total)
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)∗
3. Humanitarian aid (code 72010-74010)
Death rate, crude (per 1,000 people)
Refugee population by country or territory of asylum∗
4. Transport and storage (code 21010-21081)
Roads, paved (% of total roads)
Railways, goods transported (million ton-km)∗
195. Communications (code 22010-22040)
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people)
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)∗
6. Energy generation and supply (code 23010-23082)
Electric power consumption (kWh per capita)
Electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of output)∗
7. Education (code 11110-11430)
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
Persistence to Grade 5, total (% of cohort)∗
8. Action relating to debt (code 60010-60063)
Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income)
Note: All the variables are obtained from the World Bank’s WDI CD-ROM. The asterisks
indicate alternative indicators used in Section 5.
20References
Acharya, A., A. T. F. de Lima, and M. Moore (2006). Proliferation and fragmentation: Trans-
actions costs and the value of aid. Journal of Development Studies 42(1), 1–21.
Alesina, A. and D. Dollar (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic
Growth 5, 33–63.
Barro, R. J. (1990). Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of
Political Economy 98(5), 103–125.
Baulch, B. (2006). Aid distribution and the MDGs. World Development 34(6), 933–950.
Burnside, C. and D. Dollar (2000). Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review 90(4),
847–868.
Canning, D. and E. Bennathan (2000). The social rate of return on infrastructure investments.
Policy Research Working Paper Series. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Cassen, R. and Associates (1994). Does Aid Work? Report to an Intergovernmental Task Force
(2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chatterjee, S. and S. J. Turnovsky (2007). Foreign aid and economic growth: The role of ﬂexible
labor supply. Journal of Development Economics 84(1), 507–533.
Clemens, M. A., S. Radelet, and R. Bhavnani (2004). Counting chickens when they hatch:
the short-term eﬀect of aid on growth. CGD Working Paper 44. Washington DC: Center for
Global Development.
Dollar, D. and V. Levin (2004). The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2002. World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3299. Washington DC: World Bank.
Easterly, W., R. Levine, and D. Roodman (2004). Aid, policies, and growth: comment. American
Economic Review 94(3), 774–780.
21Futagami, K., Y. Morita, and A. Shibata (1993). Dynamic analysis of an endogenous growth
model with public capital. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 95(4), 607–25.
International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Oﬃce (2004). Evaluation of the IMF’s
Role in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility.
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.
Kalaitzidakis, P. and S. Kalyvitis (2008). On the growth implications of foreign aid for public
investment co-ﬁnancing. Review of Development Economics 12(2), 354–371.
Kasuga, H. (2007). The Millennium Development Goals and Aid Allocation: Which donors give
high-quality aid? RIETI Discussion Paper 07-E-050. Tokyo: RIETI.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2007). Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2006. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4280.
Washington DC: The World Bank.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton (1999). Governance Matters. World Bank
Working Paper. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Morss, E. R. (1984). Institutional destruction resulting from donor and project proliferation in
Sub-Saharan African countries. World Development 12, 465–470.
Roodman, D. (2004). The Anarchy of Numbers: Aid, Development, and Cross-country Empirics.
CGD Working Paper Number 32. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
Roodman, D. (2006). An Index of Donor Performance. CGD Working Paper Number 67.
Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
Sawada, Y., H. Yamada, and T. Kurosaki (2007). Is aid allocation consistent with global poverty
reduction? A Cross-donor Comparison. presented at RIETI International Workshop on Eco-
nomics of Foreign Aid, July 2nd.
Strauss, J. and D. Thomas (1998). Health, nutrition, and economic development. Journal of
Economic Literature 36(2), 766–817.
22Thiele, R., P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Dreher (2006). Sectoral Aid Priorities: Are donors really
doing their best to achieve the Millennium Development Goals? Kiel Working Papers 1266.
Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Thiele, R., P. Nunnenkamp, and A. Dreher (2007). Do donors target aid in line with the
Millennium Development Goals? a sector perspective of aid allocation. Review of World
Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv) 143(4), 596–630.
23Table 1: Major donors in each sector: accumulated bilateral aid in 1996-2005
Sectors Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Largest USA USA USA JPN JPN JPN FRA JPN USA
(0.696) (0.234) (0.408) (0.645) (0.440) (0.537) (0.198) (0.240) (0.223)
2nd CAN GBR GBR DEU USA USA DEU FRA JPN
(0.073) (0.146) (0.096) (0.091) (0.126) (0.137) (0.155) (0.224) (0.205)
3rd JPN JPN NLD FRA FRA DEU JPN DEU DEU
(0.044) (0.098) (0.077) (0.066) (0.076) (0.101) (0.118) (0.128) (0.093)
4th ITA NLD NOR ESP NLD GBR GBR USA FRA
(0.039) (0.066) (0.050) (0.036) (0.052) (0.050) (0.081) (0.100) (0.093)
5th GBR FRA SWE GBR ESP FRA NLD GBR GBR
(0.035) (0.064) (0.050) (0.031) (0.050) (0.035) (0.078) (0.092) (0.082)
Note: Figures in parentheses are the donor’s share of total bilateral aid for the sector. See Data
Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix B for the list of eight selected sectors.
24Table 2: The share of each donor’s total aid per sector
Donor Period Sectors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
AUS 1996-2000 0.022 0.085 0.067 0.053 0.003 0.011 0.215 0.008
2001-2005 0.039 0.075 0.110 0.048 0.002 0.002 0.091 0.008
AUT 1996-2000 0.003 0.080 0.028 0.007 0.000 0.009 0.205 0.324
2001-2005 0.004 0.026 0.018 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.140 0.483
BEL 1996-2000 0.023 0.108 0.061 0.016 0.008 0.008 0.111 0.147
2001-2005 0.007 0.072 0.045 0.020 0.004 0.006 0.101 0.285
CAN 1996-2000 0.086 0.021 0.118 0.004 0.016 0.045 0.057 0.059
2001-2005 0.023 0.056 0.098 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.099 0.105
CHE 1996-2000 0.012 0.050 0.192 0.038 0.010 0.011 0.048 0.015
2001-2005 0.004 0.036 0.210 0.012 0.001 0.012 0.035 0.046
DEU 1996-2000 0.011 0.026 0.037 0.127 0.005 0.074 0.108 0.142
2001-2005 0.004 0.021 0.040 0.038 0.002 0.051 0.138 0.267
DNK 1996-2000 0.000 0.090 0.011 0.118 0.008 0.050 0.059 0.051
2001-2005 0.000 0.064 0.012 0.076 0.004 0.039 0.060 0.027
ESP 1996-2000 0.006 0.123 0.055 0.071 0.015 0.075 0.126 0.077
2001-2005 0.006 0.054 0.047 0.104 0.013 0.029 0.105 0.257
FIN 1996-2000 0.000 0.057 0.137 0.007 0.002 0.049 0.076 0.038
2001-2005 0.001 0.061 0.146 0.001 0.008 0.036 0.106 0.004
FRA 1996-2000 0.000 0.028 0.004 0.071 0.015 0.040 0.141 0.258
2001-2005 0.004 0.031 0.053 0.043 0.002 0.011 0.171 0.444
GBR 1996-2000 0.001 0.089 0.086 0.044 0.003 0.048 0.086 0.076
2001-2005 0.013 0.071 0.097 0.018 0.006 0.024 0.066 0.244
GRC 1996-2000
2001-2005 0.002 0.081 0.056 0.035 0.005 0.000 0.186 0.000
IRL 1996-2000 0.010 0.108 0.113 0.050 0.002 0.001 0.156 0.057
2001-2005 0.013 0.183 0.096 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.144 0.009
ITA 1996-2000 0.052 0.048 0.104 0.013 0.010 0.019 0.065 0.331
2001-2005 0.029 0.040 0.050 0.019 0.001 0.054 0.043 0.473
JPN 1996-2000 0.004 0.019 0.012 0.286 0.024 0.164 0.028 0.054
2001-2005 0.004 0.023 0.022 0.186 0.012 0.127 0.057 0.303
LUX 1996-2000
2001-2005 0.016 0.187 0.150 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.190 0.000
NLD 1996-2000 0.002 0.052 0.109 0.030 0.006 0.020 0.078 0.087
2001-2005 0.002 0.039 0.084 0.022 0.007 0.012 0.098 0.039
NOR 1996-2000 0.000 0.041 0.208 0.010 0.009 0.064 0.077 0.021
2001-2005 0.001 0.081 0.132 0.017 0.007 0.040 0.106 0.012
NZL 1996-2000
2001-2005 0.003 0.046 0.111 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.252 0.000
PRT 1996-2000 0.000 0.019 0.009 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.059 0.564
2001-2005 0.000 0.024 0.018 0.060 0.006 0.003 0.139 0.365
SWE 1996-2000 0.000 0.050 0.166 0.030 0.015 0.044 0.058 0.001
2001-2005 0.001 0.044 0.120 0.027 0.004 0.021 0.056 0.027
USA 1996-2000 0.085 0.047 0.127 0.001 0.005 0.015 0.033 0.017
2001-2005 0.053 0.045 0.151 0.014 0.004 0.041 0.023 0.093
Average 1996-2000 0.016 0.057 0.082 0.050 0.009 0.037 0.089 0.116
2001-2005 0.010 0.062 0.085 0.036 0.005 0.024 0.109 0.159
Note: See Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix B for the list of
eight selected sectors. There are no data from CRS for Greece, Luxembourg and New Zealand
in the period 1996-2000.
25Table 3: Aid allocation across countries in 8 sectors
Donor 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001- Total
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
AUS 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 15
AUT 2 3 3 8
BEL 1 6 7 6 20
CAN 4 2 5 5 6 5 5 32
CHE 2 3 1 5 7 5 3 26
DEU 3 3 5 5 8 6 6 36
DNK 1 2 4 6 4 5 22
ESP 1 1 4 4 10
FIN 1 3 4 3 3 14
FRA 2 2 5 4 5 6 6 30
GBR 2 2 3 4 6 5 6 28
GRC 2 2
IRL 4 5 9
ITA 2 5 7 5 4 23
JPN 2 3 4 5 6 7 5 32
LUX 3 3
NLD 2 4 5 6 6 8 5 36
NOR 1 2 2 2 6 4 5 22
NZL 3 2 5
PRT 3 3 2 8
SWE 2 2 4 4 5 4 5 26
USA 2 2 3 3 7 5 5 27
Total 23 27 44 60 97 91 92 434
Note: Figures are the number of sectors with a signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcient (Spearman’s
ρ). See Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix B for the list of eight
sectors.
26Table 4: Aid allocation across sectors in recipients (at most 125 countries)
Donor 1971- 1976- 1981- 1986- 1991- 1996- 2001- Total
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
AUS 3 1 2 3 3 12
AUT 1 1 3 5
BEL 3 4 3 10
CAN 1 3 4 2 4 1 5 20
CHE 3 5 3 3 14
DEU 2 3 8 2 8 6 3 32
DNK 1 1 3 2 3 10
ESP 3 5 8
FIN 1 1 3 4 9
FRA 1 3 1 4 1 9 19
GBR 1 5 2 8
GRC 0
IRL 3 3
ITA 3 2 1 1 7
JPN 2 1 1 2 7 4 8 25
LUX 3 3
NLD 6 6
NOR 1 3 5 9
NZL 0
PRT 1 1
SWE 2 2 4 8
USA 1 2 1 2 4 12 22
Total 6 14 22 16 44 53 76 231
Note: Figures are the number of recipient countries with a signiﬁcant correlation coeﬃcient
(Spearman’s ρ). See Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix B for the
list of eight sectors.
27Table 5: Estimation results: Transport and storage by all donors
sector i Transport Transport Transport Transport Transport Transport
sector j Food Food Health Health HA HA
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005
index(i) 29.03 50.50 0.29 2.08 1.99 6.64
(19.77) (32.80) (0.65) (2.13) (5.32) (3.92)∗
index(j) 41.38 -239.26 -0.19 0.90 41.98 55.54
(92.41) (195.83) (0.48) (2.34) (34.01) (24.08)∗∗
lagged dependent 0.62 0.75 0.32 2.29 0.05 0.21
variable (0.16)∗∗∗ (0.39)∗ (0.09)∗∗∗ (2.29) (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.12)∗
observation 76 68 57 104 106 107
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B
for the list of indices. The indices are lagged values and measured by deviations from the
worst environment. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
28Table 6: Estimation results: Communications by all donors
sector i Telecom Telecom Telecom Telecom Telecom Telecom
sector j Food Food Health Health HA HA
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005
index(i) 3.83 1.47 -0.23 0.07 -0.64 2.80
(2.62) (0.99) (0.14) (0.04) (1.21) (2.83)
index(j) 25.44 0.81 0.99 -0.04 11.23 -30.24
(27.68) (2.23) (0.62) (0.12) (17.64) (53.00)
lagged dependent -0.00 -0.00 0.42 0.01 0.32 -0.00
variable (0.00) (0.01) (0.18)∗∗ (0.01) (0.02)∗∗∗ (0.01)
observation 83 74 60 113 116 114
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B
for the list of indices. The indices are lagged values and measured by deviations from the
worst environment. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
29Table 7: Estimation results: Energy generation and supply by all donors
sector i Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy Energy
sector j Food Food Health Health HA HA
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005
index(i) -27.15 12.67 0.45 -0.04 -3.75 6.83
(39.51) (7.91) (0.31) (0.33) (2.50) (5.54)
index(j) 1030.06 -11.72 -2.01 0.57 59.85 -111.72
(899.60) (31.96) (0.96)∗∗ (0.69) (43.35) (127.30)
lagged dependent 0.58 -0.00 0.15 -0.00 0.06 0.36
variable (0.64) (0.00) (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.27)
observation 57 49 39 70 75 73
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B
for the list of indices. The indices are lagged values and measured by deviations from the
worst environment. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
30Table 8: Estimation results: Education by all donors
sector i Education Education Education Education Education Education
sector j Food Food Health Health HA HA
1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005 1996-2000 2001-2005
index(i) 80.62 150.66 -0.75 -5.32 -401.66 90.13
(140.91) (154.38) (1.04) (6.14) (487.13) (68.26)
index(j) 2701.58 116.74 1.23 12.34 -305.19 -105.86
(2638.09) (104.68) (1.18) (5.45)∗∗ (1446.49) (253.94)
lagged dependent -1.26 0.01 0.79 -0.00 8.69 0.00
variable (1.42) (0.00)∗ (0.24)∗∗∗ (0.00) (1.52)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗∗
observation 75 70 55 103 103 106
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B
for the list of indices. The indices are lagged values and measured by deviations from the
worst environment. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
31Table 9: Estimation results: Diﬀerences across regions
ɹ
sector i Transport Transport Energy Energy Energy Education
sector j Health HA Health Health Health Health
1996-2000 1996-2000 1996-2000 2001-2005 2001-2005 2001-2005
index(i) 0.43 3.70 0.44 -0.04 1.73 7.82
(0.59) (4.79) (0.31) (0.32) (0.55)∗∗∗ (6.08)
EA ∗ index(i) -4.66 -104.69 -3.97 -16.92
(0.57)∗∗∗ (44.63)∗∗∗ (1.78)∗∗ (8.06)∗∗
income ∗ index(i) -0.43 -5.63
(0.18)∗∗ (3.22)∗
index(j) -0.23 21.66 -2.03 0.58 -1.85 -3.47
(0.47) (23.64) (0.96)∗∗ (0.70) (0.93)∗∗ (3.88)
EA ∗ index(j) 9.00 781.03 6.49 31.55
(1.57)∗∗∗ (269.85)∗∗∗ (3.05)∗∗ (14.72)∗∗
income ∗ index(j) 0.73 4.34
(0.35)∗∗ (2.23)∗∗
lagged dependent 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.00 -0.00
variable (0.09)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗∗ (0.05)∗∗∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
observation 57 106 39 70 66 99
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B for the
list of indices. EA includes eight middle or high income recipients in East Asia. The indices are
lagged values and measured by deviations from the worst environment. Figures in parentheses
are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance
at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
32Table 10: Estimation results: Corruption and allocative eﬃciency
ɹ
sector i Transport Energy Telecom Energy Education
sector j Health Health Health Health Health
1996-2000 1996-2000 2001-2005 2001-2005 2001-2005
index(i) -0.29 0.37 0.03 -0.28 -11.85
(0.47) (0.31) (0.06) (0.44) (8.84)
corruption ∗ index(i) 2.47 9.27 0.41 1.45 15.68
(1.49)∗ (4.58)∗∗ (0.24)∗ (0.71)∗∗ (8.48)∗
index(j) -0.07 -2.03 0.10 1.13 15.48
(0.52) (0.95)∗∗ (0.16) (0.90) (6.97)∗∗
corruption ∗ index(j) -4.32 -12.53 -0.61 -1.80 -15.07
(2.38)∗ (6.26)∗∗ (0.35)∗ (0.96)∗ (6.98)∗∗
lagged dependent 0.37 0.15 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
variable (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.04)∗∗∗ (0.01) (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)
observation 57 39 112 70 101
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B
for the list of indices. The indices are lagged values and measured by deviations from the
worst environment. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
33Table 11: Estimation results: Low-quality public service and allocative eﬃciency
sector i Transport Education Energy Education
sector j Health Health Health Health
1996-2000 1996-2000 2001-2005 2001-2005
index(i) -0.31 -2.15 -0.28 -9.76
(0.44) (1.48) (0.41) (7.96)
government ∗ index(i) 4.17 2.31 2.12 11.82
(1.63)∗∗∗ (1.86) (0.89)∗∗ (7.83)
index(j) -0.04 2.10 0.90 13.68
(0.53) (1.78) (0.81) (6.06)∗∗
government ∗ index(j) -6.29 -2.32 -2.57 -12.05
(2.07)∗∗∗ (1.29)∗ (1.10)∗∗ (6.62)∗
lagged dependent 0.38 0.78 -0.00 -0.00
variable (0.08)∗∗∗ (0.24)∗∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)
observation 57 55 70 101
Note: The Tobit model is used. All regressions include a constant. See Data Appendix B
for the list of indices. The indices are lagged values and measured by deviations from the
worst environment. Figures in parentheses are heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively.
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